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Thursday, 14 April 2011

Thursday afternoon update... 4/14

Posted on 11:02 by Unknown
NISA is reporting sharply rising temperatures in No. 3 reactor. Apparently the highest is about 250C. TEPCO is saying now that the readings could well be erroneous, due to a failing temperature measuring device (so it's either the RTD or thermocouple or ICW or the instrument drawer.)

Most of the recovered volume in the No. 2 plant pipe tunnel outside has been refilled by more contaminated water. NISA remarks that the water might be coming from the turbine building; that was our speculation, and probably everyone else's, a long time ago.

There are also increases in activity in groundwater measurements.

Even if we discount the first piece of information as spurious instrument reading, the second two are troublesome. Clearly (and we're saying the same things over and over again) TEPCO needs to get recirculating cooling operating, and to do this TEPCO needs to get access to the auxiliaries and equipment in No. 2 plant. This means the contaminated water in the turbine building has to be removed. It seems a number of tanks and a tank truck have been ordered from the US and one might wonder if there needs to be a rapid response to the problems at No. 2 plant that's a bit more aggressive than waiting for the chance to pump this water to an ideal location. Good enough might have to do for now.

Some further details about the decom plan offered by Toshiba have come out, and they're pretty much as one would expect. The time span offered to site clear is still about ten years.

These situations are all developing and details emerging, so we'll return with new information as necessary.

2:20 PM Eastern Thursday 4/14
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Wednesday, 13 April 2011

Wednesday evening update / Chernobyl comparison

Posted on 17:31 by Unknown
Thank you to all our regular readers and all our new ones for setting a new one day discrete hit counter record, for the Blogger calendar day April 12th. I appreciate your visits and your comments and questions very much.

Very little new to report from Fukushima Daiichi at the moment; water transfer procedures continue, while the rest of the temporary silt screens have been mounted across the seawater inlet gates inside the breakwater. Note: These will have to be removed once the seawater pumps are ready to be placed back in service.

It is very interesting, and heartening, to see the relatively calm worldwide response to the NISA decision to self-raise the INES level at Fukushima Daiichi to Level 7... except in the United States, that is. Most organizations and most nations are responding with calm, and level-headedness.

Of course the status up there at "Level 7" was previously only occupied by the Chernobyl-4 accident in 1986 and one wonders, given the admission by everyone who has looked at data that Fukushima Daiichi has in total released about 1/10 the radioisotopic material that Chernobyl did, how it's possible that three concurrent reactor accidents all with core damage and four spent fuel storage facility incidents/accidents with at least one guaranteed fuel damage event (that at No. 4 was as we noted confirmed, but we all already knew it) could have a LOWER total release than an accident at one reactor. If we take the consideration of "source term," used by many AEC / NRC calculations for plant siting and accident evacuation area which is based on total megawatt capacity, it would seem that the Fukushima Daiichi situation would HAVE to be worse, correct?

No. Not even close. Two reasons: Steam explosion in the core, and lack of containment. These refer to Chernobyl-4.

The details are so widely available on the accident scenario that we are obligated either to give the briefest of accounts or else go into detail never before seen; since the real 'front page story' is Fukushima, we'll select the brief version.

Chernobyl-4 was destroyed by a reactivity addition accident; the core was placed in a condition, from a core physics standpoint, in which it was extremely unstable .. and it was done deliberately so that the operators could complete a required test. (A recirc pump flow coastdown test..) A test that would tend to increase the power rating in a manner of behavior that many Soviet operators may not even have been aware of. When the test was initiated, power rose instantly in the core, which caused the core to increase the amount of steam void. The reactor became autocatalytic, and the resultant rapid increase in heat caused a steam explosion. (There was likely a water slug effect, like that at SL-1, which increased the destructive effect of the power burst and steam expansion.) When the top covering of the reactor was literally blown right away, and all the coolant escaped, the super-hot graphite moderator, now exposed to air, began to burn fiercely. The massive release of radioactive contamination began.

Now, we're not here to go into a huge amount of technical detail on Chernobyl, or for that matter the particular model of reactor that was destroyed there (which is known as the RBMK-1000 reactor.) But we can show you the second aspect mentioned: Containment. Look back at many previous articles on this blog to study containment and you'll see (as will our regular readers) how different the illustrations I'm about to show you .. from the APRA files .. really are.

First up is an end view of the reactor complex, cut right through the reactor itself.
RBMK-1000 "Channel Type" Water-cooled, Graphite-Moderated Boiling Water Reactor with forced recirculation and external steam separation:

The reactor is at the center of the drawing. This reactor contains 1693 fuel channels, mounted in a giant cylinder constructed of graphite moderating blocks. And giant this reactor core is; the core diameter is 464.6 inches, while the core height is 275.6 inches. Immediately obvious is the fact that there is NO pressure vessel. The core is sitting in a concrete chamber which measures 70.87 feet on the sides and is 83.66 feet deep. Below the reactor, many hundreds of water inlet pipes feed water to the vertical channels where it's heated until boiling. This mixture exits the top of the reactor through many steam/water pipes and enters the moisture separator drums marked "5" on the drawing. (Note: Those of you familiar with the old GE BWR/1 plants, specifically Dresden-1 and Big Rock Point will recognize these external style steam drum separators.. and they're sort of distant cousins of the early steam generator designs manufactured by Foster-Wheeler and Babcock & Wilcox for Shippingport Atomic Power Station and Indian Point 1.) Anyway, the separated water is returned to the reactor while the steam leaves this building area for the turbine building. Note the recirculation pumps, "6" on the drawing.

It is hard to imagine a more highly complicated primary plant design. From what I can recall most or all of those entry pipes under the reactor had a throttle valve, and part of the plant setup was to properly adjust each one of these for proper flow in the channels above. What is more, many large BWR reactors have been described as "loosely coupled" here in the US.. this reactor core is as loosely coupled as any ever built. (For you non-nuclear folks, this means that nuclear characteristics in one part of the core might be totally different, steady-state, from those in another part.) As mentioned, this core has 1693 channels for fuel, and uses about 200 control rods for various specific purposes.

Here is a side view showing not only the reactor building, but the turbine building of a fairly typical RBMK-1000 reactor plant.

One of the most prominent features in both illustrations is the machine seen above the reactor; this is the refueling machine. The RBMK-1000 is refueled WHILE CRITICAL and ON LINE, by use of simple top covers for the channels and this large machine. It pulls out spent fuel units and replaces them with new ones while the plant produces power. Again, we must note that this sounds good until you realize that you cannot do this if you have a pressure vessel of any sort.

Item: Soviet pressurized water reactor plants do of course have pressure vessels. But most of them don't have any type of containment, just as the RBMK series plants don't have any containment. (Soviet PWR plants have the designation VVER.)

In the illustration above, the turbine building is on our left and we see the end view of the turbine and the condensers. In the reactor building, we can see to the right of the reactor a fuel cooling chamber for immediate deposition of spent fuel units, next to which is an open space between the concrete walls. Just outside of this next set of walls is actually accessible by vehicles for bringing in fresh fuel and taking out spent fuel. Yes, there are heavy concrete walls around the reactor, but access is permitted to the building through large doors that trucks go in and out of. Further as pointed out, we see just how open the plant is above the reactor itself.

It should now be totally obvious to anyone why the photos of the destruction of the Chernobyl-4 plant looked so bad; nothing was there to contain the energy. When exposed to air, the graphite moderator burned fiercely.

There are no reactors like this in operation anywhere in the United States. Or in Japan, for that matter.. or anywhere else in the world.

Finally just for comparison, we mentioned how large the core volume of the RBMK-1000 is and to compare with a plant variant at Fukushima Daiichi, namely the BWR/4 which is that found in Fukushima Daiichi No. 2, 3, 4 and 5... The BWR/4 has an active core height of 144 inches and a core diameter of 158.5 inches. The core output of the RBMK-1000 is 3200 MWt while the BWR plants we're comparing now are 2381 MWt. Even if we step up and compare apples to apples, using Fukushima Daiichi No. 6 which is a BWR/5 at 3293 MWt the core active length stays the same at 144 inches while diameter increases to 187.1 inches. This again against the RBMK core at 275.6 inches high and 464.6 inches in diameter. Which is also full of graphite. Without any pressure vessel.

Hopefully this will put the Chernobyl comparisons to bed, at least so far as plant details are concerned.

9:15 PM Eastern Wednesday 4/13
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Posted in "chernobyl", "fukushima daiichi", "RBMK" | No comments

A couple of afternoon updates....

Posted on 09:49 by Unknown
TEPCO is reporting that there is indeed damage to the fuel stored at No. 4 plant's spent fuel pool as a result of obtaining a water sample from the pool which contains fission products. This is only the final confirmation of something we already knew, since hydrogen generated at the plant already exploded and there is no core installed in the reactor vessel.

NISA has instructed TEPCO to immediately perform as full an inspection as is possible to structures at Fukushima Daiichi to determine if they retain their original earthquake resistance, with a view toward ordering TEPCO to reinforce, however necessary, any compromised structures. This naturally focuses on the four reactor buildings and their auxiliary and turbine buildings. This has been ordered in light of the continuing aftershocks near the site and off shore which are quite severe in nature, and seem to be happening about every other day continually since the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11th.

Dewatering continues, even though it is the middle of the night in Japan.

1:00 PM Eastern Wednesday 4/13
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Tuesday, 12 April 2011

Fukushima Daiichi developments... Tuesday evening

Posted on 18:30 by Unknown
The press is reporting a number of developments, very widely, so I'll just echo them here with some analysis.

TEPCO continues to move water around.... TEPCO is in the initial phases of dewatering the No. 2 plant's turbine building and pipe tunnel to restore as normal shutdown cooling as is possible given the situation. This plant has the most highly contaminated water of any of the sites, both in its turbine building and in its outside service water pipe tunnel. It's interesting to note the revelation of the spike in aerial activity that correlates with the drywell or suppression pool integrity failure on this plant and to also note the very high level of contamination found in abnormal areas in this plant. We'll look carefully through the data that have been revealed to see whether this is simply due to a lack of water in the suppression pool to scrub contamination from venting of the plant, or if perhaps the containment was vented to the turbine building as an emergency measure.

TEPCO high-purity nitrogen injection to unit No. 1 continues... Even though TEPCO has been putting nitrogen into the drywell on No. 1 plant, the pressure is not increasing as much as they think it should be due to this. That is making TEPCO think that they've lost integrity on this drywell as well, perhaps not as badly as at No. 2 but enough to allow a stabilization of pressure right around 30 psia. Many studies have speculated about primary containment failure modes, but one has to wonder if the collapse of the top part of the reactor building.. which should include a refueling crane somewhere.. has not damaged the drywell head. On this plant, it does appear that much of the upper structure dropped straight down instead of being blown all over the area as in the example of No. 3 plant.

Apparently most of the problematic water at No. 5 and No. 6 plants has been disposed of. The latest photo of the Fukushima Daiichi site shows the barge with the crane on it back in action near the inlet area for Nos. 1 through 4 plants.

9:52 PM Eastern Tuesday 4/12
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Boiling Water Reactors.... some further details 2

Posted on 12:43 by Unknown
In our previous installment, we looked at some features relative to the reactor cores, pressure vessels, recirculating water flow and normal core water flow while the plant is in operation. We also looked at a view of the reactor building itself. Let's expand our view a little bit and look at some of the other systems.

First let's look at the primary function of the reactor, which is to generate steam for use in providing power for not only the plant's many systems but for the grid. It will be helpful to look at this flow diagram from WASH-1082.

We see above, that steam exits the reactor and is directed to the High Pressure turbine. Moisture that would be damaging to the later LP turbines is extracted, used to heat the feedwater to the reactor and then sent to the condenser. Meanwhile, the majority of the steam continues to power the Low Pressure turbines, on the same shaft as the HP turbine and the generator. The steam, now much less energetic, exits the turbines and enters the condensers where enough heat is removed to convert it to water. (The heat is rejected to service water, which in the case of Fukushima Daiichi is seawater.) The condensate pumps remove water from the condensers and direct it through demineralizers, or condensate polishers, a series of feed heaters and finally to the feed pumps which have enough power to pressurize the water highly enough to enter the reactor against the roughly 1000 pounds of pressure inside. From here, we've already seen in the previous post how the water travels in the reactor and is converted to steam.. so we now have the whole, simplified cycle.

Now, at Fukushima, it appears that the earthquake triggered an automatic plant shutdown .. which means full scram of the reactors (full rapid insertion of control rods) and tripping of the turbine throttles. At this point, the plants' emergency diesels started and began running to provide power to the many electric pumps (some of which you've seen in this and the last installment) and other systems on site. One might imagine that, at this time, the reactors were being slowly cooled down via dumping steam through the dump lines directly from the reactor to the condenser in a controlled fashion. Thus, although the turbines were bypassed, steam flow and water flow that was removing decay heat from the reactor cores was very much as normal when the plants are operating even if at very greatly reduced rates.

Arrival of the tsunami would have changed all that. All electric power went out; this means loss of all AC power for all the pumps in the plants. DC power, via batteries, was still available and there was at least one system that could be used in this case to provide some core cooling with no available electrical power. This system, using steam from the reactor to drive a steam turbine water pump, is called RCIC or the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system. Operation of this system requires only station battery power. See below.

This system uses a turbine, fed off the reactor steam line and whose exhaust dumps to the suppression pool, to supply water to the reactor from the condensate storage. The assumption for operation of this system is that system pressure is being relieved in the reactor pressure vessel by lifting and reseating of the relief valves, which also dump to the suppression pool. However, in order for the heat to get out of the suppression pool, the RHR system must be operating. Unfortunately most of the components of this system are in the reactor building, which for the three Fukushima plants is not only heavily damaged but now a very high radiation area.


Above is the RHR or Reactor Heat Removal system. This is really a flexible system, with numerous valves (not shown) and various inlet and outlet pipes so that the system can perform a number of different functions as needed. The system can partially reflood the core (LPCI or Low Pressure Coolant Injection function), perform cooling of the containment (the drywell, that is) or it can be operated as a shutdown cooling system.

Above, and again from WASH-1082 we see the system configured for Shutdown Cooling. Note the flow that taps off of a recirculation pump. The system can be split during a normal shutdown process so that part of the RHR system is providing core cooling while the other is providing makeup water, essentially the LPCI function to keep core water level the same as the reactor cools down.

Note that all of this requires AC power for pumps, and note again that the RHR System Pumps and RHR System Heat Exchangers are all in the reactor building. Moreover, cooling for a number of pumps is provided by a Reactor Building Cooling Water system, which is also electrically powered.

That gives a good first look for our readers at some of the actual operative systems. Clearly, TEPCO would like to get some form of the RHR systems working again because this involves recirculating water and cooling it, instead of injecting water to the reactor core and releasing it. It's also clear that not only electric power, but access to the equipment is necessary and given the wide coverage of the radiation levels and the damage at the plants it's easy to see why this is taking so long to accomplish.

We'll make more technical updates like this for the general reader and concerned citizen.. everywhere... as they become warranted.

4:30 PM Eastern Tuesday 4/12
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Boiling Water Reactors... some further details.

Posted on 11:03 by Unknown
Now that we're seeing a further media explosion about the Fukushima Daiichi accident being raised to an INES Level 7 event, there are sure to be a lot more questions... and a lot of implications to US plants and plants everywhere else. It's time to take a little closer look at some of the features of the plants there at Fukushima as best we can ascertain from here.

Readers of this blog already know a lot about the setup of the relationships that have to be arranged when a nuclear plant is to be built. If you did not see the article on that, then please click here and read this first. Remember that different architect-engineers will design buildings and structures for a given job differently, and specs provided by the owner-operator can vary. Further, plants built over a span of time have to comply with newer and newer regulations and some of the new requirements are also fitted to older plants when necessary.

We've also talked a bit in the past about containment designs, and shown the evolution of BWR containment. If you are not familiar with this, then click here for a good primer on this, and then click here to see some more information. Readers might also want to revisit our most popular online article on the BWR DRY WELL which will cover the function and construction of this feature.

With that background behind us, let's stop a moment and note that while there are many mentions of the containment designs relative to Fukushima, and elsewhere (these are the MkI, the MkII and MkIII Boiling Water Reactor Containment) there is only scattered mention of the actual reactor design. Actually, this has gotten a bit more coverage than one might think because every single JAIF status chart from very early on until now has listed the core type of the plants at Fukushima Daiichi, as separate from the containment types. Fukushima Daiichi No. 1 is a BWR/3 reactor core design; Nos. 2 through 5 are BWR/4 reactors while No. 6 is a BWR/5 reactor.

These are generational designations created by GE to describe, generally, design features of a reactor core, core vessel and some supporting systems. There were a variety of power ratings for each style of core, using more or less fuel elements so that simply seeing a "BWR/4" designator doesn't necessarily imply the actual core thermal power rating.

There are many differences between the actual reactor models, although after a time some parts are standardized (especially concerning control rod drive.) However, from BWR/3 on, jet pump core recirculation was used and since all involved plants there are this model or newer, let's begin right there with a look at the actual core flow, and in-vessel design in normal operation at one of these reactors. We'll use a simplified WASH-1250 schematic for core flow in a jet pump BWR reactor.

Following the path of water flow beginning at the feedwater line, we see that this water enters the pressure vessel though the feed nozzle (a term we've seen here a lot, since it's one of the few working temperature indicators at the plants) and moves down around the outside of the core barrel into an annular plenum space. Some of the water goes all the way down and is taken into the suctions of the recirculation pumps, where it's pressurized and blasted down through a nozzle pointing into the throat of the jet pump inlet. This is where the rest of the feedwater goes; this jet pump puts a strong suction on the throat and sucks in feedwater from the plenum, which then enters the lower area of the reactor vessel below the core.

As the water then rises up through the core, it is heated as it passes through the core assembly. Some of the water begins to boil, and more and more of it is boiling as the mixture reaches the top of the core. This violent mixture of steam and water is separated by several series (not shown in detail in this drawing) of moisture separators that use either a swirling, centrifugal action or else baffles to make the water droplets fall out of the steam. The now fairly pure steam exits the top of the moisture separators and exits the vessel through the steam line, while the saturated water falls back to be mixed with the incoming feed water in the outer plenum, helping pre-heat this feedwater.

Now, this is a very simple drawing. Let's take a look at another one, from WASH-1082 that shows a BWR of the vintage we're concerned with at Fukushima Daiichi to see how this theoretical design is actually manufactured.

We can see the feedwater inlet on the right, high up, and the steam outlet on the left of this drawing, also high up. The jet pumps can be made out standing in the space between the core barrel and the pressure vessel; see the paired venturi type jet pumps on the left. The recirculation pumps are of course electrical, and are right near the reactor vessel, inside the dry well.

Let's point out one technical fact here; One of the aspects of this design worth noting is the fact that if anything in the recirculating line breaks, allowing water to exit through this line, then this can only drop water level IN THE CORE as low as the top end of the jet pump inlet nozzles. This height is about 2/3 of the way up the active core region. As we will see, there are quite a number of other pipes that tap off the recirculating water piping. This could well explain some of the problems with core cooling at Fukushima Daiichi's reactor plants... if any plant has any leakage or failure in this piping, it could leave up to 1/3 of the core upper end not submerged in water. We already know that the upper portions of the core on all three plants are damaged, and in fact No. 1 plant is said to have over 2/3 of the core damaged.

Also, in the above drawing, look for the core plate. This is a heavy plate lower in the reactor vessel, with round holes in it. The label is on the right. This is the plate on which the fuel assemblies sit. This plate is pivotal in core melt scenarios; one major question being "Does the core melt cause failure of the core plate allowing core material to drop to the bottom of the pressure vessel or not?" If a large amount of the core fuel assemblies melt and drop onto the plate, it could conceivably fail. Further, it's also obvious that melting and demolishing of parts of the core could easily lead to blockage or restriction of water flow through the core itself.

Now look at the very base of the drawing, showing the heavy support on which the reactor sits; inside this are the control rod drive mechanisms. Early on, flooding of the drywells was discussed a great deal (this could take up to 6 hours or so to accomplish just up to the reactor vessel support skirt) and here we see one thing that hurts the ability of this action to remove heat from the reactor; air would be trapped in this area as the dry well filled, limiting the height to which water would enter the area of the vessel support skirt on this design.

Let's take a look at yet another picture of a containment building, again a Mk I containment housing a BWR/4 reactor. This is probably the closest illustration we've yet put up to the actual structures at most of the Fukushima Daiichi plants.

This is from WASH-1082. The building foot is 14 feet below ground. The refueling floor, commonly mentioned in articles about Fukushima here and elsewhere and clearly marked on this drawing is 149 feet above the building foot level.

In our next installment we'll look at some of the actual fluid systems involved to get a better idea of what TEPCO is trying to restore access to, and use of.

3:00 PM Eastern Tuesday 4/12
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Posted in "BWR", "containment", "fukushima daiichi" | No comments

NISA commentary on INES level 7

Posted on 08:35 by Unknown
Here is the official briefing, right off the NISA section of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry site:

APRIL 12 DOCUMENT / NISA-METI INES Level 7

You'll all note, again, the factor of ten or one order of magnitude difference between the estimated total emissions so far as comparing the accident at Fukushima Daiichi and at Chernobyl-4.

I would just add one thing again, for whatever it is worth: In reality what is occurring at Fukushima Daiichi is a compound event. Essentially there are three reactor accidents in progress simultaneously; there are also what might be called two spent fuel pool incidents and two spent fuel pool accidents in progress at the same time (the spent fuel pool situation is far worse at No. 3 and No. 4 plants, it seems.) So then we have essentially SEVEN simultaneous event chains in progress at the same site, each of which would be newsworthy by itself; all of which are complicating each other. We should keep this in mind when we continue to refer to the "Fukushima Daiichi Accident."

11:40 AM Eastern Tuesday 4/12
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  • "fukushima daiichi" nuclear reactor accident nitrogen inert radiolytic radiolysis hydrogen
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  • "fukushima daiichi" nuclear reactor accident site update status project future
  • "fukushima daiichi" nuclear reactor accident sodium silicate liquid glass diagram drawing perspective pipe tunnel trench contamination sea seawater
  • "fukushima daiichi" nuclear reactor accident TEPCO NISA JAIF update
  • "fukushima daiichi" nuclear reactor accident update TEPCO JAIF NISA
  • "fukushima daiichi" nuclear reactor accident water leakage contamination workers found dead
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Blog Archive

  • ▼  2013 (71)
    • ▼  October (5)
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      • SCE Requests Arbitration in SONGS Steam Generator ...
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      • Resin-based solution to Fukushima water problems
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